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This paper develops a dynamic general-equilibrium model with productive public capital 
to  help  account for  differences in  the  business cycle characteristics  of  public-  versus 
private-sector expenditures in postwar U.S. data.  A specification that allows for multiple 
stochastic shocks  (to technology  and  depreciation rates)  can  reproduce  a  number  of 
features  describing  the  cyclical  behavior  of  U.S.  public  investment  and  public 
consumption as well as other fiscal variables, such as average marginal tax rates and the 
government debt-to-output ratio.  The model also delivers reasonable predictions for the 
behavior of  private-sector aggregates.  It  is less successful, however, in  capturing the 
large variability of  public consumption expenditures in U.S. data, and it overpredicts the 
variability of the capital tax relative to the labor tax. 
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In postwar U.S. data, the cyclical behavior of public investment and public consumption is very 
different from the behavior of their private-sector counterparts. In comparison, public investment is much 
less  variable  than  private  investment,  while  the  reverse  holds  true  for  consumption,  i.e.,  public 
consumption is about twice as variable as private consumption. Moreover, the correlation between public 
expenditures and  output  is very  weak. This contrasts sharply  with the  highly procyclical nature  of 
private-sector  expenditures.  In  this  paper,  I  develop  a  dynamic  general-equilibrium  model  with 
productive public capital to  help  account for  these types of  differences,  as  well  as  other features 
describing the cyclical behavior of  U.S. fiscal policy. The approach represents an effort to carefully 
model the behavior of  an entity--namely, the government--that directly accounts for about one-quarter 
of U.S. GNP and whose policies greatly impact the behavior of agents that generate the remaining three- 
fourths. This approach can be viewed as a natural extension of recent efforts to integrate fiscal policy 
into equilibrium models of the business cycle. 
This paper builds on the recent work of Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994a,b), who develop 
a competitive real business cycle (RBC) model in which a government policymaker chooses an optimal 
sequence of distortionary taxes in a dynamic version of  the Ramsey (1927) optimal tax problem. The 
model developed here differs from theirs in three important respects. First, public capital is introduced 
as an  input  to the economy's  production  technology.  This feature motivates the public investment 
process and is consistent with an expanding body of theoretical and empirical research which suggests 
that public capital may play an important role in the dynamics of growth and output.'  Second, due to 
the specification of constant returns to scale in all inputs, competitive firms realize positive economic 
profits in equilibrium. This implies that the optimal steady-state tax on capital is positive, consistent with 
U.S.  observations. Furthermore, I show that when profits are taxed at the same rate as capital rental 
income, the stochastic version of the model pins down a unique decentralization that is consistent with 
the optimal allocations. In a model without profits, the optimal steady-state tax on capital is zero, and 
 h he ore tical models with productive public expenditures include Arrow  and Kurz (1970), Barro (1990), Barro and Sala-i- 
Martin (1992), Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1993a), Baxter and  King (1993), and  Glomm and Ravikumar (1994). Some recent 
empirical applications include Finn (1993) and Kocherlakota and Yi (1995). Aschauer (1993) provides a review of the empirical 
evidence regarding the productive effects of public capital. 
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expenditures are endogenized by  introducing a separable term in the household utility function. In the 
Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe model, government spending follows an exogenous stochastic process. 
I compare simulation results from four versions of  the model that differ according to the tax 
regime (distortionary versus lump-sum taxes) and the process governing stochastic shocks (single versus 
multiple shocks). The cyclical behavior of  the allocations turns out to be similar under the two tax 
regimes, regardless of  the shock specification. However, the distortionary tax model encompasses a 
larger set of endogenous fiscal variables. The additional variables are the distortionary tax rates on labor 
and capital income and the government debt-to-output ratio. 
The model with distortionary taxes and multiple shocks (to technology and depreciation rates) 
can  reproduce  the  following  stylized  facts  describing  the  behavior  of  U.S.  fiscal  policy:  Public 
consumption and public investment are much less procyclical than their private-sector counterparts; 
private investment is more variable than public investment; the capital tax is more variable than the labor 
tax; the correlation between tax rates and output is relatively weak; and the government debt ratio is 
about twice as  variable as output.  The model  also delivers reasonable  predictions for the cyclical 
behavior of private-sector aggregates. 
The model's  principal shortcomings are its inability to capture the high variability  of  public 
consumption expenditures observed in the data and its overprediction of the variability of the capital tax 
relative to the labor tax. Other deficiencies are that the debt-to-output ratio is too countercyclical, and 
the correlation between public expenditures and output is still higher than that observed in the data. I 
find that the introduction of  additional features, such as shocks to the demand for public goods and 
higher profit levels, can help remedy some of these shortcomings. I also experiment with an alternative 
tax structure in which labor and capital incomes are taxed at the same rate. However, I find that this 
specification does not have much impact on the cyclical behavior of the optimal allocations. 
Some related research includes Rojas (1993), who examines the optimal behavior of  public 
%he zero tax result is discussed by Arrow and Kurz (1970), pp.  195-203, and has been further elaborated on by Judd (1985) 
and Chamley (1986). The non-uniqueness result is shown by Zhu  (1992) and Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994a). 
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modeling approach treats fiscal policy as a series of  exogenous shocks. For example, Christian0 and 
Eichenbaum (1992) include stochastic government spending in the household utility function to shift the 
labor s~lpply  curve and thereby help explain the low observed correlation between postwar U.S. labor 
hours and real wages (as measured by average labor productivity). Braun (1994), McGrattan (1994), and 
Dotsey and Mao (1994) show that similar results can be obtained by introducing stochastic distortionary 
taxes to shift the labor supply curve. Ambler and Paquet (1994a) develop an RBC model in which some 
of the government's fiscal variables (such as public investment and nonmilitary public consumption) are 
endogenous, while others (such as the income tax and military spending) are exogenous. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sections 2 and 3 describe the model and 
define a competitive equilibrium under each tax regime. The computation procedure and the choice of 
parameter values is discussed in section 4. Section 5 examines the quantitative implications of the model 
and presents the simulation results. Section 6 concludes. 
2.  The Model 
The model economy consists of households, firms, and the government. All goods are produced 
using a privately owned technology that exhibits constant returns to scale in the three productive inputs: 
labor, private capital, and public capital. This specification implies that private firms earn an economic 
profit equal to the difference between the value of output and payments made to the private inputs. The 
existence of  profits yields a positive optimal tax rate on capital in the steady state for the model with 
distortionary taxes3 As owners of the firms, households receive net profits in the form of dividends. 
Various options regarding the taxation of these dividends are considered. 
3~ones,  Manuelli, and Rossi (1993b) show that when profits derive from productive public goods, the absence of a separate 
profits tax yields a positive optimal tax rate on capital in the steady state. However, if profits derive from the monopoly power 
of firms, Guo and Lansing (1995a) show that  the optimal steady-state tax  on capital can be positive, negative, or zero.  In  a 
perfectly competitive environment with no profits, the  optimal steady-state tax on capital is zero. 
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There is a large number of identical, infinitely lived households, each of  which maximizes a 
stream of discounted utilities over sequences of consumption and leisure: 
- 
max  Eoxpt  (lnc, -Ah, + Blng,)  OcP  c1,  A, B>O. 
I4 
In this utility function, P is the household discount factor and c, represents private consumption 
goods. The symbol E, is the expectation operator conditional on information available at time t. Each 
household is endowed with one unit of time each period and works h,  hours during period t. The fact 
that utility is linear in hours worked draws on the formulation of indivisible labor described by Rogerson 
(1988) and Hansen (1985). This means that all fluctuations in total labor hours are due to changes in 
the number of workers employed, as opposed to variations in hours per ~orker.~  Household preferences 
also include a term representing the utility provided by public consumption goods g, . For simplicity, I 
interpret g, as representing a per capita quantity of public goods that is free from congestion effects or 
specific user charges. The separability in c, and g, implies that public consumption does not affect the 
marginal utility of private consumption, a specification supported by parameter estimates in McGrattan, 
Rogerson, and Wright (1993). Households view g, as outside their control. 
The representative household faces the following within-period budget constraint: 
where x, is private investment, kt is private capital, and b,,,  represents one-period, real government bonds 
carried into period  t+l by  the household. Households derive income by  supplying labor and capital 
services to firms at rental rates w,  and r, . Two additional sources of household income are the firm's 
net profits ft,  (which are distributed to households as dividends) and the interest earned on government 
bonds r,,  b, . 
?n  postwar U.S. data, about two-thirds  of the variance  in total hours is due to changes in the number of  workers.  See 
Kydland and Prescott (1990). 
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assume that the tax authority does not distinguish between profits and other types of capital income. As 
a result, the tax on capital income also functions as a tax on profits, but one with an endogenous upper 
bound. This scenario is reflected in equation (2), where net profits  fit, capital rental income r, kt, and 
bond  interest  r,,  b,  are all  taxed  at  the  same rate  z,, . Labor  income  is taxed  at the rate  z,,  . The 
term z,,S,k,  represents  the  depreciation  allowance  built  into  the  U.S.  tax  code,  where  6,  is  the 
depreciation rate.  The depreciation  rate for tax  purposes  is  assumed  to  coincide  with  the rate of 
economic depreciation. Finally, T, represents a lump-sum tax. 
The following equation describes the law of motion for the private capital stock: 
kt+,  = (1-S,)k,  + x,. 
In equations (2) and (3), the depreciation rate can vary over time according to an exogenous stochastic 
process that will be specified shortly. The depreciation rate for public capital (6,,)  is also allowed to 
vary.  Variable depreciation rates  can be  thought  of  as capturing  the impact  of  external  forces (for 
example, energy prices) on the utilization level or on the degree of obsolescence of the existing capital 
stock.5 Households view  tax rates,  wages,  interest rates, dividends,  and  depreciation  as determined 
outside their control. 
'several  recent  examples  where  shocks  of this  sort  have  been  successfully  used  in  business  cycle  applications  are 
Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988), Hercowitz and Sampson (1991), and Ambler and Paquet (1994b). 
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transversality conditions (TVC) are 
TVC:  limEoPth,k,+l=O,  limEoP'h,b,+,=O, 
t +-  t +-  (4e) 
where  h,  is  the  Lagrange  multiplier  associated  with  the  budget  constraint  (2).  The  transversality 
conditions ensure that (2) can be transformed into an infinite-horizon, present-value budget constraint. 
2.2  The Firm's Problem 
Output (y, ) is produced by identical private fms  that seek to maximize after-tax profits, subject 
to a technology that exhibits constant returns to scale in the three productive inputs, h,, kt,  and k,,,  where 
k,,  is the per  capita stock of  public capital.  As  with g,, I assume that public  capital is free from 
congestion  effects  and  specific  user   charge^.^  The  production  technology  is  subjected  to  serially 
correlated exogenous shocks z,  that are revealed to agents at the beginning of period t. These shocks 
generate equilibrium business cycle fluctuations in the model. Since the focus here is on the (detrended) 
business cycle movements of  variables, the model abstracts from exogenous technical progress. The 
firm's  decision problem can be summarized as 
?Specifying  k,,  as a per capita quantity ensures that there are no scale effects associated with the number of firms (see Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin. [1992]). This setup can be viewed as incorporating an implicit congestion effect associated with the number 
of firms (which is equal to the number of  households here). For a model with an explicit congestion effect that is linked to the 
size of  the private capital stock, see Glomm and Ravikumar (1994). 
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8  8  8, 
Y,  = exp(z,) k, ' h, 'kc,  ocei<l,  +e2+e3  = 1.  (6) 
The above expressions  allow for the possibility  that  the firm's  profits  may  be  taxed  directly.  The 
government's use of the tax rate z,  for this purpose implies that the tax authority does not distinguish 
between households and firms when assessing taxes on capital income. As before, this ensures that 
profits will not be completely taxed away. When y=  2, profits are initially taxed at the firm level and 
then taxed again as dividends at the household level. When y  = 1, dividends are taxed only at household 
level. When y=  0, the effective tax rate on profits is zero. In reduced form, the y=  0 case captures the 
possibility that the tax authority cannot observe pure profits. The first-order conditions from (5) are 
Each household is the owner of  a fm  and receives the firm's  after-tax profits in the form of 
dividends. The expression for dividends is 
The  stochastic  process  governing  the  evolution  of  the  technology  shock  and  the  capital 
depreciation rates is summarized below: 
E-,  z,,  6,,  &GO  given.  (9) 
In (9), @ is a 3x3 transition matrix, @,  is a 3x1 matrix of constants, and E,,  is a 3x1 matrix of 
serially uncorrelated residuals. The residuals are drawn from a normal distribution with mean 0 and 
covariance matrix Ze .  When the off-diagonal elements of @ are non-zero, innovations in technology can 
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2.3  The Government's Problem 
The government chooses an optimal program of taxes, borrowing, and public expenditures to 
maximize the  discounted utility  of  the household. Two versions of  the  government's  problem  are 
considered, depending on the type of tax instrument available to the policymaker. The first-best solution 
is obtained  with lump-sum taxes. In  this  case, zht=  z,  =O for all t. The more realistic  second-best 
solution is obtained when  all taxes  are distortionary, namely,  when  T,=O  for  all t.  To avoid time 
inconsistency problems, I assume that the government can commit to a sequence of policies announced 
at t = 0.  Following the approach of Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994a), I further assume that zm and 
r,  are  specified  exogenously  such  that  tax  revenue  collected  at  t=O cannot  finance  all  future 
expenditures. If the initial levy on private-sector assets is sufficiently large, then the government chooses 
z,,  =  zkt =  0 for some t >  f  This case is not very interesting because after period i, the distortionary tax 
model looks identical to the model with lump-sum taxes. In per capita terms, the government's budget 
constraint and the law of motion for public capital are as follows: 
Government expenditures on the left-hand side of (10) include public consumption g,, public 
investment x,,  and an adjustment cost for public investment equal to x,,  cp(x,,/  k,,).  Following Abel 
and Blanchard (1983), adjustment costs  are formulated as  a premium  cp(  -)  paid  for each  unit  of 
investment goods relative to consumption goods. The properties of  cp(  -)  are cp(0) =  0, cp'(  .  ) >  0, and 
cp"(  .) >  0. In the computations, a simple quadratic version of  cp(  .) is employed: cp(  -)  = ?h  a(~,,/k,,)~, 
where a>  0. The presence of  a small adjustment cost ensures that public investment always remains 
positive in the stochastic simulations. This cost can be viewed as reflecting differences in the way that 
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undertake an infrastructure project may require a public debate or a voter referendum to settle issues 
about financing or environmental impact. 
The summation of the household budget constraint (2) and the government budget constraint (10) 
yields the following per capita resource constraint for the economy: 
Yt  =  9,  X,  +(P(~G,'~GI)]'  (I2) 
Because the resource constraint and the government budget constraint are not independent equations, 
equation (12) can be used in place of (10) in formulating the government's problem. 
As a condition for equilibrium, government policy must take into account the rational responses 
of the private sector, as summarized by  (2), (3), (4), (7), and (8). For the distortionary tax case, these 
equations can be conveniently summarized by  the following "implementability constraint": 
Equation (13) is obtained by  substituting the first-order conditions of the household and the firm 
into the present-value household budget constraint, with T,  =  0 for all t.7 When y = 0, the capital tax for 
t 2  1 does not appear in the implementability constraint. Since z,  and r,  are specified exogenously, the 
government's problem in this case amounts to choosing a set of allocations h, (= 11 c, ), h, ,  g, ,  kt+,  ,  and 
kG,,  for all t to maximize household utility (1) subject to (12) and (13). Given the optimal allocations, 
the appropriate set of  prices r, and w,, and policy variables z,, ,  z,, ,  and r,,  that decentralize them, can 
be computed using the profit-maximization conditions (7), the household first-order conditions (4), and 
the household budget constraint (2). For example, the optimal allocations uniquely determine w, through 
equation (7b). Given h, and w, ,  equation (4b) uniquely determines the government's optimal choice for 
7~ore  specifically, equation (13) is obtained as follows: Multiply both sides of the household budget constraint (2) by A,, 
take expectations at t=  0,  substitute in (4a)-(4d) and (8), iterate the resulting expression forward and sum over time, and finally, 
apply the transversality conditions (4e). 
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optimal interest rate on government debt. The expectation operators in (4c) and (4d) imply that the after- 
tax returns on capital and bonds  (weighted by  marginal utility) must be the  same "on average." In 
response to a series of shocks, the government can satisfy this ex ante arbitrage condition and implement 
the optimal allocations using many different decentralizations involving z,,  and r,,  .  Consequently, when 
y = 0 (or when  1 - 8, - 8, = O), the model does not uniquely pin down the time-series behavior of these 
policy  variables. (See Zhu  [I9921 and  Chari, Christiano, and  Kehoe  [1994a] for a more complete 
description.) 
When y>  0, the capital tax for t2  1 appears in (13). In this case, (4c) must be imposed as a 
separate constraint on the government's problem, and z,,  for t 2 1 is an additional decision variable. In 
contrast to the earlier indeterminate case, the model now implies a unique decision rule for z,,  that is 
consistent with the optimal allocations. Given this decision rule, equation (2) and the optimal allocations 
uniquely determine r,,  . Intuitively, the restriction that profits and dividends must be taxed at the same 
rate as capital rental income pins down a unique decentralization to support the allocations.' 
Under lump-sum taxes, the optimal allocations can be obtained by maximizing (1) subject only 
to the resource constraint (12). In this case, government expenditures can be financed by any arbitrary 
sequence of lump-sum taxes and government debt, provided that the government budget constraint is 
satisfied in present-value terms (see Sargent [1987], chapter 3). 
'~ohn  (1994) provides a related example where a restriction on the menu of available policy instruments pins down a unique 
decentralization. In his model, capital incomes derived from different technologies must all be taxed at the same (state-contingent) 
tax rate. 
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subject to 
with zo , 60  , 6G0,  ko ,  kGo  , b, ,  z,  , and  r,  given. The Lagrange multiplier A  associated with (1  3) is 
determined endogenously at t =  0 and is constant over time. To impose (4c) as a constraint, I apply the 
law  of  iterated expectations and group terms such that the return  function at  time  t  involves only 
variables dated t or earlier. This is done to facilitate a recursive solution algorithm. Notice that the first- 
order condition with respect to the Lagrange multiplier & recovers (4c). The lagged multiplier &, is 
treated as an additional state variable for t 2 1 in the recursive version of (14).'  When y=  0, the first- 
order condition with respect to z,  implies & = 0 for all t. This reflects the fact that (4c) does not need 
to be imposed as a separate constraint when y =  0. 
With distortionary taxes, the solution to (14) for t 2 1 can be characterized by a set of stationary 
g~ncluding  p,-, in the state vector at time t is the mechanism  by  which the commitment assumption  is maintained  when 
choosing z,  each period in the recursive version of (14). This solution method was developed by  Kydland and Prescott (1980) 
in a deterministic setting. Rojas (1993) shows how the method can be applied in a stochastic environment. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9507.pdfdecision rules A, ( s, ,  A ), h, ( s, ,  A ), g, ( s, ,  A ), kt+,  ( s, ,  A ), kc,,(  s, ,  A ), zkl  ( s, ,  A ), and ~l,  ( s, ,  A ), where 
S, ={z,  ,  6,, 6Gt,  kt,  kc, ,  CI,,).  Given these decision rules, a stationary decision rule for the government 
bond allocation b,,  (st,  A)  can be computed as the solution to the following recursive equation: 
(kt+l  +bt+l)  = b  -A  ht+l  -',+I  (1-zkt+l)y(1-el-e2)~t+l  +',+I  (kt+2  +bt+2)]'  (I5) 
Equation (15)  is the household budget constraint at t+l (with TI+,  =  0),  after taking expectations 
and substituting in the first-order conditions of the private sector. At t  = 0,  the government chooses A,, 
h, ,  go,  k, ,  kc, ,  and ~b . The t  =  0 allocations, together with the decision rules for t  21, determine A for 
a given set of  initial conditions. 
With  lump-sum taxes, A =  CI, =  0 for all  t, and  (14) collapses to  a  standard social planning 
problem. The solution to the planner's  problem for t20  can be characterized by  a set of  stationary 
decision rules A, (st),  h, (st  ), g,(s,), kt+,  (st),  and kc,,(  st  ), where s,={z,, 6,, 6,,  ,  kt,  kc, 1. 
3. Defining an Equilibrium 
This section defines a competitive equilibrium under each tax regime. In what follows, I assume 
that y > 0 so that the solution to (14)  pins down a unique decentralization under distortionary taxes. In 
this case, a competitive (Ramsey) equilibrium is defined as 
(i) A set of stationary decision rules h, ( st ,  A ), h, ( st ,  A ), g, (  st ,  A ), kt+,  ( st ,  A ), kc,,(  st ,  A ), 
zkr  ( st,  A), and u  (  st,  A ) that satisfy (14)  for t  21, where st ={z,  ,  6,, 6,,  ,  kt,  kc,, U-,  ). 
(ii) A stationary decision rule for the bond allocation b,,  (st,  A)  that satisfies (15)  for t  21 
(iii)  A set of allocations A,, ho ,  go,  k, ,  and kc, ,  and Lagrange multipliers ~b and A, that satisfy 
(14)  and (2)  given the decision rules for t  21 and the initial conditions z, ,  6,, 6,,  ,  ko ,  kc,,  b, , 
z,  and r,  . 
(iv) A sequence of factor prices r, and w, for t  2 0 defined by  (7a)  and (7b). 
(v) A sequence of  labor tax rates z,,  for t  2 0 defined by  (4b). 
(vi) A sequence of bond interest rates r,,,  for t  2 1 defined by  (2). 
Under lump-sum taxes, a competitive equilibrium is defined as 
(i) A set of stationary decision rules h (  st ), h, ( st ), g, (  st ), kt+,  ( st ), and kc,,(  st ) that satisfy (14) 
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k,  ,  and kc, 
(ii)  A sequence of factor prices r, and w, for t  2 0 defined by  (7a) and (7b). 
(iii)  An arbitrary sequence of lump-sum taxes T, and government debt b, that satisfies: 
lim  bt+l 
= 0 
(iv)  A sequence of bond interest rates r,,  for t2  0 defined by  (2). 
4. Computation Procedure and Calibration 
The stationary decision rules governing the optimal allocations in the model are obtained by 
solving a linear-quadratic approximation of  (14). The algorithm makes  use of  the fact that  (14) is 
recursive for t  2 1 under distortionary taxes and for t  2 0 under lump-sum taxes. The resulting decision 
rules, which are log-linear functions of the state variables, are valid in the neighborhood of the 
deterministic steady  state.''  Under  distortionary taxes,  the  stationary decision rules  depend  on  the 
Lagrange multiplier A, which is computed as follows. First, given an initial guess for A, I compute the 
deterministic steady state from the first-order conditions of (14) with respect to A,,  h, ,  g, ,  k,,  ,  k,,,  ,  p, , 
and 2,.  The steady-state version of (15) is then used to compute the steady-state level of  government 
debt b I repeat this procedure, adjusting A until a desired level of steady-state debt is obtained. Next, 
I use the first-order conditions of (14) at t  =  0,  together with the log-linear decision rules for t 2 1, the 
household budget constraint (2) evaluated at t  =  0  and t  = 1, and the initial conditions z,,  ti0, ti,,,  k,  , 
'O~he  computation procedure is based on the algorithm described by Hansen and Prescott (1994). Chari, Christiano, and 
Kehoe (1994b) assess the accuracy of the log-linear  approximation  method  in an optimal policy  problem  similar to the one 
presented here. They conclude that the approximation yields very accurate results for the allocations, but less accurate results for 
the tax rates, in comparison to a minimum-weighted residual method. 
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k,,,  z,,  and r,,  to compute an initial level of debt b,  that is consistent with A and b. The economy 
is  assumed to be in stationary equilibrium. All  simulations represent small fluctuations around the 
deterministic steady state. 
Parameters are assigned values based on empirically observed features of postwar U.S. data. The 
sample period begins in 1954 to avoid the influence of the Korean War. The time period in the model 
is taken to be one year, which is consistent with both the time frame of most government fiscal decisions 
and the frequency of  available data on average marginal tax rates. The discount factor  P (= 0.962) 
implies a real rate of interest of 4 percent. The parameter A in the household utility function is chosen 
such that the fraction of time spent working is equal to 0.3 in the steady state. This coincides with time- 
use studies, such as Juster and Stafford (1991), which indicate that households spend approximately one- 
third of their discretionary time in market work. The value of B is chosen to yield a steady-state ratio 
Fly  equal to 0.17, the average value for the U.S. economy from  1954 to  1992. In computing this 
average, public consumption was estimated by  subtracting total public investment (including military 
investment) from an annualized series for government purchases of goods and services (GGEQ from 
Citibase). This was done to reduce double counting, since the GGEQ series does not distinguish between 
government consumption and investment goods." 
The exponents in the Cobb-Douglas production function are chosen on the basis of two criteria. 
First, the selected values of 8, (= 0.32) and 8,  (= 0.60) are in the range of the estimated shares of GNP 
received by  private capital and labor in the U.S. economy (see Christian0 [1988]). Second, given the 
steady-state depreciation rate 6,  (described below), the output elasticity of public capital 8, (= 0.08) is 
chosen to yield a steady-state ratio of public investment to output equal to 0.03. This coincides with the 
average ratio of nonmilitary public investment to GNP in the U.S. economy from 1954 to 1992." 
With constant returns to scale in all inputs, the value of  8,  (= 1- 8, - 8,)  also determines the 
 he specific parameter values used in the computations are A =  2.480, B =  0.267 for the model with distortionary taxes, 
and A = 3.330, B =  0.285 for the model with lump-sum taxes. 
'%he  range of direct empirical estimates for 8, at the aggregate national level is quite large. Aschauer (1989) and Munnell 
(1990) estimate values of 0.39 and 0.34, respectively. Finn (1993) estimates a value of 0.16 for highway public capital. Aaron 
(1990) and Tatom (1991) argue that removing the effects of trends and taking account of possible missing explanatory variables 
(such as oil price shocks) can yield point estimates for 8, that are not statistically different from zero. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9507.pdfsteady-state level of  firm profits. Since profits do not  affect household decisions at the margin, the 
government would like to tax profits as much as possible to obtain non-distortionary revenue. Choosing 
T,,  > 0 accomplishes this objective in varying degrees, depending on the value of y.  As y increases, the 
capital tax collects a larger fraction of revenue from profits. This motivates the government to choose 
a higher capital tax and lower labor tax for a given level of profits. Since dividends are subject to double 
taxation under the U.S. tax code, I choose y = 2 as the baseline, which implies that the optimal steady- 
state tax on capital in the model is % = 0.29. This value coincides with the average effective corporate 
tax rate in the United States from 1954 to  1980, as estimated by  Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981). The 
steady-state tax on labor (Yh ) turns out to be 0.22. This is close to the average marginal tax rate on labor 
income estimated by  Barro and Sahasakul (1986) from 1954 to 1983. When y=0, the steady-state tax 
rates are 7,  = 0.10 and ?,,  = 0.33.13 
The steady-state private capital depreciation rate 8 (= 0.067) is estimated by  a least squares 
regression  of  x, - (kt+,  -kt) on  kt. An  analogous  regression  yields  the  steady-state  public  capital 
depreciation rate 6,  (= 0.022).14  The steady-state value of the technology shock is set equal to zero. The 
transition matrix cP governing the evolution of the shocks is estimated by  a vector autoregression using 
detrended annual data on z, ,  St,  and S,,  from 1954 to 1992.15 The constant vector <Po is chosen to agree 
13when profits are zero ( 8, + 8, = l), the optimal steady-state tax on capital is zero. If a separate profits tax were available, 
the government would tax profits at 100 percent and other capital income at 0 percent in the steady state (see footnote 2). 
14~ata  sources are as follows. The capital and investment series are in  1987 dollars from Fixed Reproducible Tangible 
Wealth in the United States, U.S. Department of Commerce (1993). The series for k,,  and x,,  include nonmilitary government- 
owned equipment, structures, and residential components. The series for k, and x,  include business equipment and  structures, 
consumer durables, and  residential components. The  "capital input" measure of the net  stock  was  used  for all capital data. 
Annualized series for the following variables were constructed using the indicated quarterly series from Citibase: y, = GNPQ, 
c, = GCNQ + GCSQ (nondurables and services), h, = LHOURS (household survey), y,/ h, = GNPQJLHOURS, g, = GGEQ - x,,  - 
military investment. The series for b,ly, is federal debt held by  the public as a fraction of GNP, where the debt series is from 
Federal Debt and Interest Costs, U.S. Congressional Budget Office (1993), table A-2. All variables were normalized by the total 
population series PAN from Citibase to obtain per capita quantities analogous to those in the model. Average marginal tax rates 
on labor income (z,,)  are from Barro and Sahasakul(1986) for 1954-83, McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright (1993) for 1954-87, 
and Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) for 1965-88. Average marginal tax rates on capital income (z,)  are from Jorgenson and 
Sullivan (1981, table 11) for 1954-80, McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright (1993) for 1954-87, and Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar 
(1994) for 1965-88. 
 he technology shock was measured as z, = In y, - 0.321n k, - 0.601n h, - 0.081n k,,  . The depreciation rates were measured 
as 6, = [x, - (k,,,  - k, )]  1  k,  and 6,  = [x,,  - (k,,,,  - k,,  )]  1  k,,  . Trends were removed by  regressing each series on a constant and a 
time trend and subtracting the trend. The specification with 6, and 6,  in levels yielded a much  better fit of  the data than did 
a logarithmic specification. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9507.pdfwith the steady-state values of the shock variables. The covariance matrix CE is estimated from the data 
and imposed in the simulations. The stationary stochastic process used in the simulations is 
CE  = S'-S, where S  =  I  O 
0.00531  6.224e-5 
The following matrix shows the correlation coefficients among the residuals: 
An  interesting aspect of  pE is that innovations in the cyclical component of  the technology 
variable  display  a  weak  negative  correlation  with  innovations  in  the  cyclical  components  of  the 
depreciation rates.  Also,  the correlation between innovations in the two depreciation rates is weak 
( =0.05).16 The model is also simulated with technology shocks alone. This provides a benchmark for 
comparison with the standard real business cycle specification. In this case, the depreciation rates are 
constant over time and the evolution of z,  is described by 
The parameter a (=  40)  is chosen  such that  cp(  .) =0.01 in  steady  state. This  implies that 
adjustment costs are equal to 1 percent of public investment, or 0.03 percent of output, in steady state. 
Costs of  such small magnitude seem reasonable and are sufficient to ensure that x,,  always remains 
1  %is  specification differs from that employed by Ambler and Paquet (1994b). They use Euler equations from their model 
together with  quarterly  investment  data to construct  an artificial  time series of  capital stocks and corresponding (quarterly) 
depreciation  rates.  In  the  resulting  specification, depreciation  shocks are strongly correlated with one another, but  have no 
persistence and are not correlated with technology shocks. Here, annual depreciation rates are computed from actual capital stock 
data. 
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ratio b/yequal to 0.37. This is the average level of U.S. federal debt held by the public as a fraction 
of  GNP from  1954 to  1992. The initial  conditions  z,,  6,,  k, , k,,  , and  z,  are  set  to  their 
corresponding steady-state levels,  and r, =  r, - 6,  . The initial debt ratio b, /yo that is consistent with 
these values is 0.362. 
Table 1 summarizes steady-state values for the model versus the corresponding U.S. averages 
from 1954 to 1992. For the data, three values are shown for the average marginal tax rates <  and ?,  . 
These correspond to the sample means from different studies (see footnote 14 for sources). 
5. Quantitative Implications of the Model 
5.1  Optimal Decision Rules 
Table 2 shows the optimal decision rules for selected variables in the case of distortionary taxes 
and multiple shocks.17 The optimal behavior of  public versus private expenditures over the business 
cycle can be inferred by examining the coefficients on the shock variables in the decision rules. For x,, 
and g,, the  coefficients  on  z,  are both  positive,  implying  procyclical  behavior.  The private-sector 
counterparts, x, and c, ,  are also procyclical, as evidenced by their positive coefficients on z, . Notice that 
public and private investment exhibit a sign difference regarding the coefficient on 6,. This feature of 
the model,  together  with  the  fact  that  innovations  in  the depreciation  rates tend  to  be  negatively 
correlated with innovations in z,, tends to reduce the contemporaneous correlation between public and 
private expenditures relative to the single-shock version of the model. This is a desirable outcome, given 
the weak correlation between public and private expenditures in postwar U.S. data. 
The decision rules also show that the capital tax responds much more strongly to exogenous 
shocks than  does the labor tax.  This reflects the government's  use of  the capital  tax  as a tool  for 
absorbing shocks to its budget (which are caused by changes in the size of the tax base over the business 
cycle). An increase in z, expands the tax base, allowing government spending requirements to be met 
17~or  the chosen parameter values, it can be shown that the linearized dynamic system implied by (14) possesses a unique 
set of stable, stationary decision rules for t 2  1. (See Guo and Lansing [1995b] for more details.) Where possible, the nonlinear 
versions of  the equilibrium conditions  are used  to compute the period-by-period  values  of endogenous variables  during the 
simulations. 
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base, which calls for an increase in  z,,  . Absorbing shocks mainly by  changes in  z,,,  as opposed to 
changes in z,,,  is efficient because household assets (capital and government bonds) cannot be quickly 
adjusted in response to a change in the capital tax. In contrast, the household can instantaneously adjust 
labor supply in response to a change in the labor tax.18 Given the behavior of z,,,  the optimal response 
of government borrowing to shocks is relatively small. With constant depreciation rates, the procyclical 
nature of the tax base, especially the level of profits, implies strong countercyclical behavior for z,,  and 
z,,  . With variable depreciation rates, however, the correlation between output and tax rates is reduced. 
Again, this improves comparison with the data. 
5.2  Simulation Results 
The model's quantitative predictions for the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy and private-sector 
aggregates are shown in tables 3  and 4. Figures 1-8 provide a visual comparison for some selected 
variables. 
The cyclical behavior of  the  allocations turns out to be similar under the two tax  regimes, 
regardless of  the shock specification. However, the distortionary tax  model includes a larger set of 
endogenous fiscal variables. The additional variables are the distortionary tax rates on labor and capital 
income and the government debt-to-output ratio. 
Under both tax regimes, the single-shock specification underpredicts the variability of output and, 
consequently, most of the other variables in table 3. Actually, this is a desirable feature, since evidence 
suggests that the contribution of technology shocks to fluctuations in U.S. output is less than 100 percent 
(see Aiyagari [1994]). Both tax regimes capture the fact that public investment is only about half as 
variable as private investment in postwar U.S. data. Moreover, in the model with distortionary taxes, the 
capital tax is more variable than the labor tax, a feature which also tends to characterize U.S. tax rates. 
The single-shock specification suffers from a number of  serious shortcomings. First, public 
 he  optirnality of using a state-contingent capital tax to absorb budget shocks has been shown previously by Judd (1989), 
Zhu (1992), and Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994a). 
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correlation with output observed in  the data. The predicted correlations between the components of 
public expenditures and output are both close to 1  .O. In the data, however, the correlation between public 
consumption and output is only 0.05, while the correlation between public investment and output is 0.38. 
This is further reflected in table 4, where the predicted correlations between public expenditures and 
their private-sector counterparts are much higher than those in the data. Second, the standard deviation 
of g, in the model is too low, both in absolute terms and relative to the standard deviation of c, . Third, 
under distortionary taxes, the predicted standard deviation of  the labor tax is much lower than any of 
the values based on U.S. tax rates. Fourth, the model predicts strong countercyclical behavior for tax 
rates and the government debt ratio, in contrast to the weak correlations observed in the data. Finally, 
the correlation between hours worked and average labor productivity is close to 1.0 in the model versus 
a near-zero correlation in the data. This last observation is a well-known deficiency of single-shock RBC 
models (see Christian0 and Eichenbaum [1992]). 
In general, the addition of  multiple shocks improves the model's performance in a number of 
ways. The standard deviation of output, hours, and the government debt ratio all increase to values that 
are very close to those in the data. Public expenditures become less procyclical, and as a result, the 
contemporaneous correlations between public and private expenditures decline. These correlations are 
still stronger than those observed in the data, however, especially in the case of  g, (see table 4 and 
figures  1-4). With multiple shocks, the correlations between the tax rates and output become much 
weaker, and the correlation between hours worked and average labor productivity substantially declines. 
The last observation confirms earlier results obtained by  Hercowitz and Sampson (1991) and Ambler 
and Paquet (1994b) using RBC models with a shock to the capital accumulation equation. 
The multiple-shock specification does not help much to increase the standard deviations of g, 
and z,,,  ,  and the government debt ratio remains strongly countercyclical. The correlation between the 
debt ratio and output is -0.85 in the model versus -0.18 in the data. A notable drawback to the multiple- 
shock  specification  is  that  the  standard  deviations  of  x,  and  T,  are  now  much  higher  than  the 
corresponding U.S. values. 
To summarize, the model with multiple shocks and distortionary taxes is able to capture the 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9507.pdffollowing stylized facts describing the behavior of U.S. fiscal policy: Public expenditures (g, and x,,) 
are much less procyclical than private expenditures (c, and x, ); private investment is more variable than 
public investment; the capital tax is more variable than the labor tax; the correlation between tax rates 
and output is relatively weak; and the government debt ratio is about twice as variable as output. The 
model's principal shortcomings are its inability to capture the high variability of g, relative to c,, and 
its overprediction of  the variability of  T,,  relative to T,,,  . Some other deficiencies are that b,ly, is too 
strongly countercyclical and that g, and x,,  remain more strongly correlated with output than in the data. 
Figure 3 reveals that the high variability of public consumption relative to private consumption 
in U.S. data is strongly influenced by  the sizable expansion of government spending that occurred in the 
late 1960s, coinciding with the Vietnam war. To capture this sort of phenomenon, I experimented with 
a modified version of the model that included an independent stochastic shock applied to the parameter 
B in the household utility function. This shock, which can be viewed as representing changes in the 
demand for public goods (perhaps due to wars, riots, or disasters), improved the model's performance 
in  two  ways:  first,  by  increasing  the  variability  of  g,  relative  to  c,, and  second,  by  reducing the 
contemporaneous correlation between g, and y,. The countercyclical nature of  b,ly, was also reduced, 
but only to a small degree.lg 
Figures 5-8 display the U.S. and model tax rates before detrending. For quantitative comparisons 
(tables 3 and 4), detrending is necessary because U.S. labor tax estimates all display a distinct upward 
trend, while two out of the three capital tax estimates display a downward trend. These trends have no 
counterpart in the model. The fact that the model overpredicts the variability of the capital tax relative 
to the labor tax is consistent with the results of Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994a). In their model, 
with log utility and technology shocks alone, the standard deviation of the capital tax is 17.67 percent 
(for the decentralization with uncontingent debt) versus 0.08 percent for the labor tax. In comparison, 
table 3 indicates that the standard deviation of T,,  in the single-shock specification is 4.39 percent versus 
Ig~mbler  and Paquet (1994b) adopt a different approach by introducing an exogenous stochastic component of government 
expenditures in their model. These expenditures are calibrated to U.S. data on military spending. The income tax in their model 
is also taken to be exogenous (and constant over time). In  contrast, I have chosen to endogenize all of-the government's fiscal 
variables. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9507.pdf0.38  percent  for  z,, . The  fact  that  z,  is  less  variable  here  is  due  primarily  to  the  existence  of 
profits.20 
I experimented with varying both the size of  firm profits (by changing 8,  relative to 8, ) and 
the level of  dividend taxation  (by changing y). As  either 8,  or y increased, the percentage standard 
deviation of  z,  declined. The intuition for this result is straightforward. Recall that dividends (equal to 
after-tax profits) do not distort household decisions because profits are determined outside households' 
control. Higher profits or a higher  y implies a larger and  less elastic tax base  for the capital tax. 
Consequently, smaller changes in the tax rate can produce the same revenue effect when responding to 
shocks. Although higher levels of 8, reduce the standard deviation of z,,  the resulting steady-state ratio 
?,/?  exceeds the U.S. average, which is undesirable from a calibration standpoint. Similarly, values 
of y greater than two become difficult to justify in comparison to the U.S. tax structure. 
The model's tax structure imposes a sharp distinction between the taxation of labor and capital 
incomes. In reality, however, the personal income tax encompasses income from many different sources, 
such as wage earnings and investment income. To investigate the effects of  an alternative tax structure, 
I introduced the following additional constraint in (14) to require that labor and capital incomes be taxed 
at the same rate: (1 - z,, ) =A  / (A, w,  ), where w,  = 8, y,  / h, . Table 5 shows the results of this experiment. 
The standard deviation of the optimal flat-rate income tax z,  turns out to be very low (0.80 percent with 
multiple shocks). Given that labor's share of  income is 0.60 in the model, it is not surprising that z, 
behaves  similarly  to  z,,  under  the  original tax  structure. In  steady  state, =  0.243,  which  exceeds 
- 
z, = 0.221. Ceteris paribus, a higher labor tax exerts more of  a dampening effect on hours worked (and 
output) in response to shocks. This effect, and the fact that the tax base for z, is higher than for z,,,  , 
helps compensate for the absence of the capital tax as a separate shock absorber. This is evidenced by 
the standard deviations of  the allocations in table 5, which are mostly very close to those in table 3. 
20~here  are  a  number  of other differences with  the  Chari, Christiano, and  Kehoe  model  that  are  likely  to  affect the 
quantitative comparisons. First, their solution technique involves a minimum-weighted  residual method applied to a discrete state 
space.  Second, simulated tax rates in their model are not subjected to the Hodrick-Prescott filter before computing the statistics. 
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This paper develops a model that combines elements from the theory of optimal public finance 
with  an  equilibrium  view  of  aggregate  fluctuations.  Interestingly,  the  model  predicts  that  if  the 
government responds systematically to external forces and takes into account the rational responses of 
the private sector, then fiscal variables can fluctuate substantially over the business cycle. Moreover, 
these policy variations might even be in the best interests of  households. More specifically, this paper 
demonstrates that an equilibrium business cycle model with optimal fiscal policy can reproduce a number 
of features describing the cyclical behavior of public expenditures, tax rates, and the government debt-to- 
output ratio in the postwar U.S. economy. Although the model's quantitative predictions do not coincide 
with some key aspects of  the data, the results provide encouragement for an  approach that seeks to 
explicitly  model  government  behavior  in  a  general  equilibrium  framework.  The  consideration  of 
additional features, such as voting behavior, monetary policy, or institutions that affect the commitment 
mechanism (or lack thereof), are likely to improve our understanding of the links between government 
policy and the business cycle. 
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clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9507.pdfTable 1:  Model Steady States versus U.S. Averages 
Model 
Variable  Distortionary Taxes  Lump-Sum Taxes  U.S. Economya 
y/F  0.17  0.20  0.22 
a~or  the U.S. economy, investment, consumption, and capital averages are for the period  1954 to 1992. Tax 
rate averages correspond to the sources and periods listed in footnote 14. 
Table 2:  Optimal Decision Rules (Distortionary Taxes with Multiple Shocks) 
Variable  Constant  zt  6,  6ct  In (kt )  In (kc, )  In  (~~-1) 
X,  =  0.071  0.654  0.773  0.626  -0.162  0.047  -0.020 
Source: Author's calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9507.pdfTable 3:  Business Cycle Statistics for Models and U.S. Economy 
Standard Deviation (percent) 
Model with  Model with 
Multiple Shocksa  Technology Shocks Onlya 
Distortionary  Lump-Sum  Distortionary  Lump-Sum  U.S.  Econ  m 
Variable  Taxes  Taxes  Taxes  Taxes  1954-92  'by 
Yt  1.61  1.66  1.32  1.27  1.60 
CI  0.49  0.43  0.56  0.48  0.82 
Contem~oraneous  Correlation with Out~ut 
Model with 
Multi~le  Shocks 
Model with 
Technoloev Shocks Onlv 
Distortionary  Lump-Sum  Distortionary  Lump-Sum  U.S. Economy 
Variable  Taxes  Taxes  Taxes  Taxes  1954-92 
aModel statistics are means over 250 simulations, each 39 periods long, after dropping the first 50 periods. 
Before computing the statistics, all series were logged (except for the tax rates) and detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter (see Prescott [1986]). The smoothing parameter for the filter was set equal to 10, which is appropriate for annual 
data (see Baxter and King [1995]). 
b~or  the U.S. economy, data sources are described in footnote 14. Data on  average marginal tax rates do not 
extend over the full sample. All series were logged andlor detrended as in the model. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9507.pdfTable 4:  Com~arison  of Selected Statistics 
Model with  Model with 
Multiple Shocksa  Technology Shocks Onlya 
Distortionary  Lump-Sum  Distortionary  Lump-Sum  U.S. Econgmy 
Statistic  Taxes  Taxes  Taxes  Taxes  1947-92 
Ox~  19  0.27  0.40  0.61  0.63  0.47 
COrr  (xG9  x)  0.5 1  0.71  0.92  0.87  0.26  ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
og/oc  1.15  1.26  0.93  1.06  1.98 
con (g, c)  0.78  0.8 1  0.94  0.94  0.10  ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 
Oh 10~fi  3.43  3.45  2.02  1.69  2.47 
corr (h, ylh)  0.58  0.29  0.89  0.91  0.04  ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 
0,10Th  39.9  --  1  1.44  --  3.82,  1.22,  2.37 
COrr (%,  7,  )  0.67  --  0.89  --  0.29,  0.47,  0.89 
Table 5:  Model with Flat-Rate Income Tax 
Multiple Shocks  Technology Shocks Only 
Standard  Correlation with  Standard  Correlation with 
Variable  Deviation (%)  Output  Deviation (%)  Output 
Yr  1.61  1  .OO  1.31  1  .OO 
aModel statistics are means over 250  simulations, each 39  periods long, after dropping the first 50  periods. 
Before computing the statistics, all series were logged (except for the tax rates) and detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter (see Prescott [1986]).  The smoothing parameter for the filter was set equal to 10, which is appropriate for annual 
data (see Baxter and King [1995]). 
b~or  the U.S. economy, data sources are described in footnote  14. Data on average marginal tax rates do not 
extend over the full sample. All series were logged andlor detrended as in the model. 
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Sources:  Author's calculations and Citibase. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9507.pdfFIG 5:  U.S.  LABOR  TAX  FIG  6:  MODEL  LABOR  TAX 
-  Eatlmoio  from  Borra  & Sohonokul (1986)  - - -  Estlmoio  from  UcCrottan  et  01.  (1993) 
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